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The old Bohr–Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum
mechanics (QM) was held on an ontological ground. The complete-
ness problem becomes more tractable, however, if it is preliminarily
discussed from a semantic viewpoint. Indeed every physical theory
adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its observative language, in
terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and semantic com-
pleteness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In
particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that
implies its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper
that standard QM is semantically complete, which matches Bohr’s the-
sis. On the other hand, one of the authors has provided a Semantic
Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM that adopts a Tarskian theory
of truth as correspondence for the observative language of QM (which
was previously mantained to be impossible); according to this inter-
pretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches
EPR’s thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM
come to opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an in-
tegrationist perspective that interpretes non–Tarskian theories of truth
as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM) was raised
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in a famous paper(1) aiming to prove
that QM is incomplete. It is well known that Bohr replied at once with two
papers in which the completeness of QM was asserted.(2,3) The debate on
this subject then involved many scholars and it is not completely exhausted
nowadays, even if Bohr’s position is largely prevailing among physicists.
Completeness of QM was meant in an ontological sense by EPR, who won-
dered whether “elements of reality” of the physical object that is observed
exist that have no counterpart within QM. Bohr assumed instead that the
object under observation together with the observing apparatus form a single
indivisible system that cannot be further analyzed, at the quantum mechani-
cal level, into separate distinct parts.(4) Hence, the debate was largely affected
by the different philosophical positions of the competitors and could hardly
lead to indisputable conclusions.
We mantain in this paper that, for every physical theory, the complete-
ness problem becomes more tractable if it is preliminarily discussed from a
semantic viewpoint. Indeed, whenever this change of perspective is accepted,
a notion of semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced
by referring to the language of the theory rather than to a problematic ex-
ternal reality, which provides rigorous criteria for estabilishing whether this
kind of completeness occurs or not. In addition, such a semantic approach
shows from the very beginning that semantic completeness is connected with
objectivity, which also can be defined rigorously at a semantic level, via the
theory of truth that is adopted for the observative language of the physical
theory (Sec. 2). Whenever one applies this approach to standard QM (i.e.,
the formalism of QM expounded in modern manuals, together with its stan-
dard or Copenhagen interpretation), which adopts a verificationist theory of
truth and meaning for its observative language, one gets that this theory is
nonobjective (Sec. 3.1); moreover, one can provide a mathematical proof of
its semantic completeness (Secs. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5). This proof constitutes
the main result in this paper and supports Bohr’s thesis within the frame-
work of standard QM. On the other side, the semantic approach also suggests
that one can construct alternatives to the standard interpretation of QM by
choosing different theories of truth for the observative language of QM. Such
a suggestion is interesting since it opens new ways to investigation that may
help in solving some old problems in QM, as the measurement problem. How-
ever, among the alternative choices that are abstractly possible (one could
focus, for instance, on an intuitionist theory of truth) there is an obvious
privileged candidate, i.e., the Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence.
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Indeed, this theory is supported by an old philosophical tradition which goes
back to Aristotle, is adopted by the language of classical physics, and accords
with the use of the natural language as a metalanguage for physical theories
(QM included); in addition, it guarantees (semantic) objectivity and its adop-
tion is implicitly suggested by the EPR paper. Notwithstanding this, such a
possibility has not been explored for a long time, since there are some well
known no–go arguments (in particular, the Bell and Bell–Kocken–Specker
theorems) which seem to imply that it is inconsistent with QM itself. But
this conclusion can be criticized from an epistemological viewpoint (though
the aforesaid theorems be obviously correct from a technical viewpoint), as
one of us has shown in a series of papers (see Sec. 4.1). Standing on this crit-
icism, a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of the formalism of QM can
be provided which adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence. Ac-
cording to this interpretation (which avoids a number of problems that afflict
standard QM), QM proves to be objective but semantically incomplete (Sec.
4.2), which matches EPR’s thesis. Thus, we can now choose between two
different interpretations of QM, which lead to opposite conclusions regard-
ing semantic objectivity and completeness. It can be proven, however, that
the SR interpretation may reinterpret the semantic completeness of standard
QM, providing a framework in which both EPR’s and Bohr’s viewpoint find
a proper place. This result is obtained by adopting an integrationist per-
spective, according to which non–Tarskian theories of truth can be embodied
within a Tarskian (suitably extended) context as theories of metalinguistic
concepts different from truth (Sec. 5).
2. TRUTH THEORIES, OBJECTIVITYANDCOMPLETENESS
The notions of objectivity and completeness have been widely studied
by philosophers and scientists. We propose here two definitions that aim to
single out the semantic contents of these notions in the common language
of physics. To this end, let us resume here some results about physical the-
ories that can be estabilished within the known epistemological perspective
(received viewpoint (5,6)) that we adopt in this paper. According to this per-
spective, any physical theory T is stated by means of a general language
of high logical complexity, which contains a theoretical language LT and an
observative (or pre–theoretical) language LO.
1 The former constitutes the for-
mal apparatus of the theory and contains terms denoting theoretical entities.
1The possibility of distinguishing between theoretical and observative language has
been widely criticized in the literature, mainly on the basis of the argument that theory
and observation are strictly intertwined. We cannot discuss this subject in detail here. We
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The latter is linked to the former by means of correspondence rules, which
provide a partial and indirect interpretation of LT into LO. Furthermore, LO
is interpreted by means of assignment rules. These make some symbols of
LO correspond to macroscopic entities, as preparing or registering devices,
outcomes of measurement, and so on. Basing on the assignment rules, the
interpretation of T adopts, often implicitly, a theory of truth, which defines
truth values for some (not necessarily all) statements of LO (the word defines
must be stressed here; indeed, the truth theory is not required to provide the
methods for determining truth values2).
Keeping within the context schematized above, we mantain that, both in
classical and in quantum physics, every elementary statement of LO states
a physical property of an individual sample of a physical system of the kind
considered by T (see in particular Sec. 3.3); moreover, it is verifiable, or
testable, which means that it is associated with a verification procedure that
allows one to determine its truth value whenever this value is defined (in the
case of a complex statement of LO, instead, it may happen that, even if a
truth value is defined, a verification procedure does not exist).
The notions of (semantic) objectivity and (semantic) completeness can
now be introduced. Let us begin with the former. We say that the properties
of a physical system Σ are (semantically) objective in a physical theory T,
or, briefly, that T is (semantically) objective, if and only if the theory of
truth adopted by T for its observative language LO defines truth values for
all elementary statements of LO, independently of the actual determination
of these truth values attained by means of measurements.
As a sample of objectivity one can take any physical theory T in which a
limit ourselves to summarize our position about this problem. First of all, we agree that
stating T implies a number of choices about the basic observative domain on which T has to
be interpreted (e.g., preparations of physical objects, measurement outcomes, observables,
etc.; of course, this domain can be extended while developing T), which makes the choice
of LO depend strongly on T. Secondly, we also admit that the observative domain may
be seen as theory–laden: nevertheless, because of Campbell’s principle,(7) we mantain
that the part of the theory embodied within the observative domain must not depend
on the theoretical structure that one wants to interpret (hence the noun pre–theoretical
language that we have proposed above as a possible alternative to the noun observative
language for LO). This allows us to distinguish between LT and LO without denying the
theory–ladeness of LO.
2For instance, a theory of truth as correspondence assumes that a statement of a given
language is true if and only if it corresponds to a state of affairs. According to Tarski,(8)
this conception of truth can be formalized by means of a set–theoretical semantic model,
in which the non logical terms of the language (as individual constants, predicates, etc.)
correspond to objects or set of objects, while connectives and quantifiers correspond to set–
theoretical operations. Thus, a truth value is defined for every interpreted statement of the
language without mentioning the way in which such a value can be actually determined.
4
Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence is adopted for LO (as in classical
physics): indeed, in this case a truth value is defined for every statement of
LO independently of any measurement (see footnote 2), hence the properties
of any physical object are objective in the sense specified above (note that
adopting a Tarskian truth theory for LO implies at most, via assignment rules,
accepting a macroscopic form of realism which postulates only the existence
of the entities that can be observed at a macroscopic level, though this truth
theory be compatible with more binding forms of realism). Standard QM
provides instead a typical sample of nonobjective theory (see Sec. 3.1).
Let us come to completeness. Let us consider a sublanguage L of the
observative language LO of T. We say that the physical theory T is (seman-
tically) complete with respect to L if and only if it allows one to predict, by
means of a set of physical laws and prescriptions about the initial conditions
which define the physical situation that one is considering, the truth values
of all statements of L that have a truth value, in the given physical situation,
according to the truth theory adopted by T.
We have thus introduced a notion of completeness that is semantic, not
ontological. The restrictive clause “in the given physical situation” is intro-
duced in it in order to take into account some special features of standard
QM that will be discussed in Sec. 3.1.
The above definitions make it apparent that objectivity and completeness
of a physical theory T are connected through the truth theory adopted by
T for LO. Indeed, the truth theory determines the set of all statements of
any sublanguage L of LO that are meaningful (i.e., have a truth value) in
a given physical situation, that is, the set of statements whose truth values
must be predictable by T if T has to be complete with respect to L. Changing
the truth theory may transform T into a theory T′ with a different status:
for instance, a nonobjective but complete (with respect to L) theory could
transform into an objective but incomplete theory. This is exactly what
occurs in the case of QM whenever different theories of truth are adopted,
as we will see in the next sections.
We close this section by noticing that the definition of semantic com-
pleteness of a physical theory provided above fits in with the use of the word
completeness in physical literature and also matches the definition of seman-
tic completeness of entirely formalized systems, as defined in formal logic.
However, we will not discuss this topic in detail in the present paper.
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3. NONOBJECTIVITYANDCOMPLETENESS OF STANDARD
QM
As we have anticipated in Sec. 1, our main aim in this section is to
show that Bohr’s claim that QM is complete can be supported by rigorous
arguments and proofs whenever completeness is meant in a semantic sense, as
in Sec. 2, and the theory of truth underlying standard QM is made explicit.
Let us begin with the latter issue.
3.1. Empirical Verificationism and Nonobjectivity
It is well known that standard QM adopts a verificationist attitude accord-
ing to which, roughly speaking, properties of individual samples of physical
systems do not preexist to their measurements, at least whenever they can-
not be actually measured without altering the system in such a way that the
previous information on the system is completely or partially lost. We call
this particular attitude empirical verificationism in the following (see also
Refs. 9 and 10) and translate it into an explicit verificationist definition of
truth and meaning for the observative language of physics, as follows.
EV. A statement of the observative language of a physical theory, be it ele-
mentary or complex, has a truth value (true/false), hence it is meaningful, in
a given physical situation, if and only if such value can be verified by means
of measurements that do not modify the given physical situation.
In the above definition, the term physical situation indicates a set of
truth values that are already known, for instance because they have been
estabilished by means of previous measurements. It is then apparent that
EV implies, in principle, that truth values can be defined only referring
to the knowledge that has already been previously achieved. However, if
the truth values of all elementary statements are assumed to be conjointly
verifiable (i.e., non–disturbing measurements verifying them exist, at least in
principle), as in classical physics, EV is practically equivalent to the definition
of truth provided by a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence. But
things are different in standard QM. Here, indeed, the uncertainty principle
holds which implies that there are sets of elementary statements whose values
cannot be verified conjointly. This has two remarkable consequences.
(i) There are complex statements that have not truth values, hence are
meaningless, in every physical situation (we briefly say that these statements
are nontestable: a well known sample of these is the statement “the particle
has position r and momentum p at time t”).
(ii) In every physical situation some elementary statements have truth
values, some have not, and the set of elementary statements having truth
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values changes with the physical situation (e.g., the statement “the particle
has position r at time t” may have a truth value only if the statement “the
particle has momentum p at time t” has no value, and conversely).
Because of (i), all complex statements of the observative language of
standard QM that are nontestable can be eliminated. This provides a new
language L made up of testable statements only (which explains how a non
classical logic, i.e. a quantum logic, may appear in this theory, see Refs.
10-12; see also Sec. 3.3). Because of (ii), there are elementary statements
in every physical situation which attribute properties to the physical object
that is considered and are neither true nor false. Thus, the corresponding
properties are not objective (in the semantic sense specified in Sec. 2) in the
given physical situation.
Nonobjectivity is a counter–intuitive aspect of standard QM, and it prob-
ably should not have been accepted by physicists if it were based only on epis-
temological choices such as the adoption of a verificationist theory of truth.
Yet, it is well known that there are arguments (in particular, the two–slit
argument) and theorems (in particular, the Bell–Kocken–Specker and the
Bell theorem) that are commonly mantained to show that nonobjectivity is
unavoidable in QM. Thus, most scholars think that one must come to terms
with this conclusion, even if it is an inexhaustible source of problems.3 The
(semantic) completeness of standard QM that also follows from the choice of
empirical verificationism, as we shall see in the following sections, can then
be seen as the reward for accepting nonobjectivity.
3.2. An Equivalence Theorem
To begin with, let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.2.1. Let Σ be a physical system, let O be the set of all observ-
ables of Σ, and let us call physical object any individual sample of Σ.(15)
(i) We denote by T, the binary relation on O defined by setting, for every
B, C ∈ O, B T C if and only if B and C can be measured in sequence on a
physical object in such a way that the second measurement does not affect the
result obtained by the first, whatever the order of the measurements may be.
3In particular, the objectification problem, i.e. the problem of how nonobjective prop-
erties can become objective in the course of a measurement, is considered by many authors
as the main problem of standard QM. The attempts at solving or avoiding it have pro-
duced a huge literature and a number of alternative interpretations, modifications and
generalizations of QM. We limit ourselves here to note that also some recent, sophisti-
cated generalizations of QM as unsharp QM, explicitly admit that the problem remains
unsolved (see, e.g., Refs. 13 and 14).
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(ii) We denote by K, the binary relation on O defined by setting, for
every B, C ∈ O, B K C if and only if the self–adjoint operators B and C
representing B and C, respectively, in QM, commute (equivalently, B K C if
and only if [B,C] = 0).
We stress that the relation T is defined in terms of measurements only,
without referring to the mathematical representation of observables estabil-
ished by QM (nor to the axioms of QM): in this sense it is independent of the
specific physical theory (classical or quantum) that one wants to adopt. On
the contrary, K is the familiar compatibility relation of elementary QM, and
its definition requires the quantum mechanical representation of observables
as self–adjoint operators on the Hilbert space of the system Σ.4
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. Let Σ be a physical system, let O be the set of all observables
of Σ, and let B, C ∈ O. Then, in standard QM,
B T C if and only if B K C.
Proof. The statement in the theorem follows immediately from Lu¨ders’
analysis of his own first criterion for the compatibility of measurements (see
Ref. 16, proof in Section 3), or from the simplified version of Lu¨ders’ proof
recently provided by Kirkpatrick (see Ref. 19, Theorem 1). However, we pro-
vide here a less general but more elementary proof which takes into account
only measurements on physical objects in pure states and observables with
discrete spectrum. To this end, let us introduce some preliminary symbols.
We denote by H the Hilbert space associated with Σ, by N the set of
4We note that B T C occurs whenever the measurements of B and C do not disturb each
other, i.e., B and C satisfy Lu¨ders’ first criterion for the compatibility of measurements.(16)
Lu¨ders also states a second criterion for compatibility (the measurements of B and C are to
be called compatible with one another if, by interposing a B measurement, the outcome of
the C measurement is not affected), which amounts to introduce another binary relation on
O, say I. Furthermore, following Davies,(17) a third criterion for compatibility is considered
by Kirkpatrick(18),(19) (B and C are compatible if, for every pair of outcomes b and c
of B and C, respectively, and for every state of the physical system, the probability of
b followed by c is the same of the probability of c followed by b), which amounts to
introduce a third binary relation on O, say S. Finally, a fourth binary relation C, usually
called commeasurability(20) can be introduced on O (B and C are commeasurable if a third
observable A exists such that a measurement of A on a sample of Σ provides simultaneous
values of B and C). All these relations are defined independently of a specific physical
theory, as T, and there is no a priori reason for thinking that they must coincide, so that
Kirkpatrick(19) wonders whether T, or I, or S has to be taken as the classical definition of
compatibility. However, all of them can be proved to coincide with K in standard QM, as
we show explicitly in the case of T.
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natural integers, by bn, cp, with n, p ∈ N , two eigenvalues of the self–adjoint
operators B and C representing the observables B and C, respectively, by
PBn (S
B
n ) and P
C
p (S
C
p ) the projection operators (subspaces) associated with
bn and cp by the spectral decompositions of B and C, respectively.
Now, let B T C. Let us consider a physical object x in a state S rep-
resented by |ψ〉 and assume that an (ideal) measurement of B on x yields
the value bn. Then, let us introduce the set Cn of all eigenvalues of C such
that SBn ∩ S
C
p 6= ∅, and consider a measurement of C following the measure-
ment of B. The outcome cp of this second measurement must be such that
a further measurement of B yields bn again with probability 1. Because of
the projection postulate, this implies that the projection operator PCp maps
every eigenvector of B associated with bn into an eigenvector associated with
the same eigenvalue, that is, PCp maps the subspace S
B
n associated with bn
into itself. Hence, cp must belong to Cn, and P
B
n P
C
p P
B
n = P
C
p P
B
n . Since
(PBn P
C
p P
B
n )
† = PBn P
C
p P
B
n , it follows P
B
n P
C
p = (P
C
p P
B
n )
† = PCp P
B
n . Further-
more, the above reasoning entails that an outcome cp /∈ Cn can never occur,
hence the probability 〈ψ|PBn P
C
p P
B
n |ψ〉 of such an outcome must be zero for
every |ψ〉 ∈ H. It is then easy to deduce that PBn P
C
p = P
C
p P
B
n also in this
case. Thus, PBn and P
C
p commute for every n and p, which implies [B,C] = 0,
that is, BK C.
It remains to show that BK C implies B T C. This implication, however,
is well known and follows by applying twice the projection postulate. 
Theorem 3.2.1 is not trivial. Indeed, the coincidence of T and K is the
deep root of the (semantic) completeness of standard QM, as we shall see in
the next sections.
3.3. Pure States and their Supports
It is well known that in standard QM a property of a physical system Σ
can be identified with a pair E = (A,∆), where A is an observable of Σ and
∆ a Borel set on the real line. Indeed, E can be interpreted as the property
“A has value in ∆”, and one says that a physical object x possesses (does
not possess) the property E if x is such that A has (has not) value in ∆.
If one considers the operator A representing A in the Hilbert space H of
Σ, the property E is associated, via spectral decomposition of A, with the
projection operator PA(∆) that represents E. According to the standard
interpretation of QM, PA(∆) also represents a dichotomic observable which
takes value 1 on a physical object x if and only if x possesses the property
E, so that we briefly identify this observable with E. Conversely, every
projection operator P is associated (in absence of superselection rules) with
a pair (A,∆), with A a suitable observable, hence it represents a property
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of Σ. For the sake of simplicity, different properties represented by the same
projection operator are usually identified, so that the correspondence between
the set of properties and the set of projection operators is one–to–one.
The set L(H) of all projection operators, endowed with the standard par-
tial order ≤ (defined by setting, for every pair (P,Q) of projection operators,
P ≤ Q if and only if the range of P is contained into the range of Q), is
a lattice that has some well known mathematical features (it is complete,
orthomodular, atomic, and satisfies the covering law, see, e.g., Ref. 21).
Correspondingly, the set L of all properties of Σ, endowed with the order
induced on it by ≤, that we still denote by ≤, is a lattice that has the same
mathematical properties. In particular, (L,≤) is atomic, and its atoms are
all properties represented by one–dimensional projections of the form |ψ〉〈ψ|,
where |ψ〉 is a unitary vector of H. If S is the pure state of Σ represented by
the vector |ψ〉, the property ES represented by |ψ〉〈ψ| is usually called the
support of S, and the mapping S → ES estabilishes a bijective correspon-
dence between the set of pure states and the set of all atoms of L. From a
physical viewpoint, ES is a dichotomic observable that has the probability
1 of yielding value 1 if and only if it is measured on a physical object x in
the state S (for, 〈ψ|(|ψ〉〈ψ|)|ψ〉 = 1). Hence, one briefly says that ES is a
property which is certainly true for every x in S, not certainly true if x is
not in S.
Standing on the above definitions and results, we add two remarks that
will be useful in the following.
Firstly, the one–to–one correspondence between the set of pure states
and the set of atoms of (L,≤) may lead one to identify the two sets.(22) This
identification must be taken with care, since it may lead one to think that
only physical objects in the state S may possess the property ES. On the
contrary, ES can be possessed also by physical objects that are in a state
S ′ 6= S (it is sufficient, indeed, that S ′ be represented by a vector |ψ′〉 such
that 〈ψ′|ψ〉 6= 0). Thus, if one considers many physical objects in different
states, the set of physical objects in the state S is usually smaller than the
set of objects that exhibit ES when tested.
Secondly, one can identify properties with monadic predicates of a classi-
cal first order predicate calculus constructed by taking elementary statements
of the form E(x), with E ∈ L and x a given physical object, and then con-
necting them by means of classical logical connectives, as ¬, ∧, ∨, →. An
elementary statement E(x) will then be true if and only if E is possessed by
x, while the truth of a complex statement will be defined by standard logical
rules (hence the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of this calculus is a Boolean
lattice). One thus obtains a language which obviously formalizes a sublan-
guage of the observative language of QM, yet it contains complex statements
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that are not testable (see Sec. 3.1).5 Therefore, if one eliminates all these
statements from the language, one is left with a further language L(x), the
elements of which can be identified, up to a logical equivalence relation, with
elementary statements of the form E(x), with E ∈ L. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to assume that the restriction of the logical order ⊆ to L(x) co-
incides with the order induced on L(x) by the order ≤ defined on L.(10−12)
Thus, (L,≤) and (L(x),⊆) are isomorphic lattices (hence (L(x),⊆) is not
Boolean, yet it is complete, orthomodular, atomic and satisfying the covering
law, as (L,≤)), and one can say that a property E ∈ L is possessed (not
possessed) by a physical object x if and only if the statement E(x) ∈ L(x)
is true (false).
By the way, we observe that the above isomorphism justifies the name
quantum logic that is usually given to (L,≤) in the literature. We stress
however that the lattice operations in (L(x),⊆) have an empirical meaning
and must not be confused with the logical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, →.
3.4. Predictability and Compatibility
We have seen in Sec. 3.3 that the support ES of a state S is a property
that is certainly true for every physical object in the state S. But, of course,
there are many properties that can be considered certainly true for every
physical object in S: to be precise, those and only those properties that
are represented by projection operators whose ranges contain the vector |ψ〉
representing S.(21) It follows easily that a property E is certainly true for
every physical object in S if and only if ES ≤ E. Thus, we are led to
introduce, for every pure state S, a certainly true domain ET (S), defined as
follows:
ET (S) = {E ∈ L|ES ≤ E}. (1)
By considering the orthocomplement E⊥S of ES in (L,≤), it is easy to prove
that, from a physical viewpoint, E⊥S is an observable that has probability 0
of yielding the value 1 if and only if it is measured on a physical object in
the state S. Hence, one briefly says that E⊥S is a property which is certainly
false for any x in S. Also in this case, there are many properties that can
be considered certainly false for any physical object in S: to be precise,
those and only those properties that are represented by projection operators
5To be precise, a complex statement α(x) is testable if and only if there is a physical
apparatus, hence a dichotomic observable, that can be used in order to verify whether α(x)
is true or false. It follows from the above arguments that this observable is also associated
with an elementary statement Eα(x). Moreover, Eα(x) is true (false) whenever α(x) is
true (false) because of the truth theory adopted by QM (Sec. 3.1). Thus, α(x) is testable
if and only if it is logically equivalent to some elementary statement Eα(x).
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whose kernels contain the vector |ψ〉 representing S. It follows easily that
a property E is certainly false for every physical object in S if and only if
E ≤ E⊥S . Thus, we are led to introduce, for every pure state S, a certainly
false domain EF (S), defined as follows:
EF (S) = {E ∈ L|E ≤ E
⊥
S }. (2)
The above definitions imply that, for every property E and physical object
x in the state S, one can predict with certainty whether E is possessed by x
or not (equivalently, whether the statement E(x) ∈ L(x) is true or false) if
and only if E ∈ ET (S) ∪ EF (S). Hence, we say that the set
EP (S) = ET (S) ∪ EF (S) (3)
is the set of all predictable properties of Σ in S.
By considering now every property E as a dichotomic observable (Sec.
3.3) we can introduce, for every pure state S, a further set EK(S), i.e. the
set of all properties of Σ that are compatible with the support ES of S,
EK(S) = {E ∈ L|EKES}. (4)
The sets EP (S) and EK(S) are linked by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let Σ be a physical system and let S be a pure state of Σ.
Then, the set EP (S) coincides with the set EK(S).
Proof. Let us firstly show that EP (S) ⊆ EK(S) (where ⊆ denotes set theo-
retical inclusion). To this end, let us consider a property E ∈ EP (S). Then,
either E ∈ ET (S) or E ∈ EF (S). These possibilities are mutually exclu-
sive, since ET (S) and EF (S) are obviously disjoint. Let E ∈ ET (S), so that
ES ≤ E. If we denote by ∧ and ∨ meet and join, respectively, in the lat-
tice (L,≤), ES ≤ E implies ES ∧ E = ES. Since ES ∧ E
⊥ ≤ ES, one gets
(ES ∧E)∨ (ES ∧E
⊥) = ES. Now, this equality shows, because of well known
results (see, e.g., Ref. 21) that ES and E (considered as dichotomic observ-
ables) are compatible, that is, ESKE. Hence, E ∈ EK(S). Let E ∈ EF (S),
so that E ≤ E⊥S . This implies E ∧ E
⊥
S = E. Since E ∧ ES ≤ E, one gets
(E ∧ES) ∨ (E ∧E
⊥
S ) = E, which shows, as above, that EKES. Hence again
E ∈ EK(S). Thus, E ∈ EP (S) implies E ∈ EK(S), so that EP (S) ⊆ EK(S).
Let us show now that EK(S) ⊆ EP (S). Let E ∈ EK(S), and let us assume
that E 6∈ ET (S). Then ES 6≤ E, hence ES ∧ E 6= ES. Since ES is an atom
of the complete lattice (L,≤), one gets ES ∧ E = 0 (where 0 denotes the
minimal element of L). Now, E ∈ EK(S) implies EKES, which is equivalent
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(because of the results quoted above) to (E ∧ES)∨ (E ∧E
⊥
S ) = E. It follows
that E ∧ E⊥S = E, hence E ≤ E
⊥
S , so that, E ∈ EF (S). An analogous
reasoning shows that E 6∈ EF (S) implies E ∈ ET (S). Thus, E ∈ EK(S)
implies E ∈ EP (S), so that EK(S) ⊆ EP (S).
Putting together the above inclusions, one gets EK(S) = EP (S). 
3.5. The semantic Completeness of Standard QM
Let us consider an elementary statement E(x) of the language L(x) in-
troduced in Sec. 3.3, and let us assume that the physical object x is in a
given state S at time t. Since E(x) belongs to the observative language LO
of QM, the truth criterion EV in Sec. 3.1 estabilishes that it has a truth
value (at time t) if and only if the property E, considered as an observable,
can be measured without modifying the physical situation. From a physical
viewpoint this means that a measurement of E must not modify the values a,
b, . . . of a complete set of commuting observables A, B, . . . , which are used in
order to determine the state S at time t (the measurements of A, B, . . . could
actually be done at a time t′ ≤ t, and the state S at t could be obtained
via Schro¨dinger equation; we assume here t′ = t for the sake of simplicity).
Since the pairs (A, {a}), (B, {b}), . . . define properties (Sec. 3.3), that we
denote by Ea, Eb, . . . , respectively, it follows that E(x) has a truth value if
and only if E TEa, E TEb, . . . (or, equivalently, if and only if a measurement
of E does not alter the truth values of Ea(x), Eb(x), . . . , which fits better
with the definition of physical situation provided in Sec. 3.1). Whenever, in
particular, one estabilishes that x is in the state S by measuring the support
ES on x, E(x) has a truth value if and only if E TES, that is, if and only if
E belongs to the set EO(S) of all properties that are objective in the state S,
defined by
EO(S) = {E ∈ L|E TES}. (5)
It is now easy to conclude that standard QM is semantically complete. In-
deed, by using Theorem 3.2.1, we get EO(S) = EK(S). By using Theorem
3.4.1 we get EK(S) = EP (S). Hence,
EO(S) = EP (S). (6)
This equation shows that the set of properties that are objective for every
physical object in the state S coincides, according to standard QM, with the
set of all predictable properties. Coming back to L(x), this implies that a
statement E(x) ∈ L(x) has a truth value if and only if E ∈ EP (S), hence
if and only if its truth value can be predicted by QM. Bearing in mind the
definition of semantic completeness in Sec. 2, we conclude that standard QM
is (semantically) complete with respect to the language L(x).
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The above conclusion seems to uphold strongly Bohr’s thesis in the old
Einstein–Bohr debate on the completeness of QM. Yet, our arguments show
that this conclusion strictly depends on the adoption of a verificationist the-
ory of truth and meaning, which is typical of standard QM but it is not an
a priori logical necessity. We will briefly discuss a possible alternative in
the next sections, which recovers Einstein’s viewpoint within a more general
perspective in which also Bohr’s thesis is properly placed.
4. OBJECTIVITY AND INCOMPLETENESS IN THE SR IN-
TERPRETATION OF QM
As we have anticipated in Sec. 1, our main aim in this section is to re-
mind that at least one new consistent interpretation of QM can be conceived
according to which QM is objective but incomplete, showing briefly how this
unconventional result can be achieved.
4.1. Criticizing Nonobjectivity
We have already observed in Sec. 2 that (semantic) objectivity and com-
pleteness of a physical theory depend on the teory of truth that is adopted
for the observative language of the theory. Our results, in Sec. 3.5 show that
standard QM is (semantically) complete with respect to the language L(x)
because empirical verificationism is adopted. Yet, we have noted in Sec. 3.1
that empirical verificationism implies nonobjectivity of properties, which is a
highly undesirable feature of standard QM. Thus, one is immediately led to
wonder whether this feature could be avoided by adopting a different theory
of truth. In principle, this could be done in several ways, but the require-
ment of objectivity (together with the general reasons expounded in Sec. 1)
strongly hints to the classical Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence. A
suggestion of this kind is implicit, in particular, in the EPR paper,(1) where
the elements of reality, are meant in an ontological sense (see again Sec. 1),
but can be considered as properties of the system that are semantically ob-
jective in the sense estabilished by a Tarskian theory of truth (while they
would not be all objective according to standard QM). However, we have
noted in Sec. 3.1 that there are known arguments and theorems that seem
to show that nonobjectivity is unavoidable in QM, so that a Tarskian the-
ory of truth (which implies objectivity) would be unsuitable for QM. Thus,
any attempt of recovering objectivity along the lines traced above should
begin with a preliminary criticism of the reasonings proving nonobjectivity.
This criticism has actually been carried out by one of the authors in several
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papers,(9,10,23) and we will not try to summarize it here. We limit ourselves
to observe that it is based on the fact that nonobjectivity is usually deduced
in a rigorous way, yet starting from premises that seem quite innocent at first
sight but prove to be rather problematic from a physical and epistemologi-
cal viewpoint if looked into more deeply. If these premises are abandoned,
nonobjectivity cannot be proved, which implies that an attempt of recovering
objectivity by adopting a suitable theory of truth is not necessarily a priori
inconsistent.
4.2. Semantic Realism and Incompleteness of QM
The general perspective that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as corre-
spondence for the observative language LO of any physical theory has been
called Semantic Realism by one of the authors in a number of previous
papers.(9,10,12,24) The choice of the name was intended to stress that this
perspective recovers, from one side, semantic objectivity of properties, so
that it is compatible with various forms of realism, while, on the other side,
it does not imply by itself any ontological engagement about the existence of
macroscopic entities (Sec. 2). Within Semantic Realism, an SR interpreta-
tion of QM has been provided (ibidem) which preserves the formal apparatus
and the statistical interpretation of QM. This interpretation has at least two
basic advantages with respect to standard QM. Firstly, properties of physi-
cal objects can be intuitively thought as preexisting to their measurements,
which brings back to a standard way of thinking. Secondly, the objectification
problem, that is, the central and unsolved problem of quantum measurement
theory, disappears.(25)
The consistency of the SR interpretation has been recently proved by
means of models.(24−26) But what about completeness of QM according to
it? It is apparent that the answer to this question is now immediate. Indeed,
if all properties are objective in any state of the physical system, while QM
provides only probabilities that are not 0 or 1 for most properties, then QM
is semantically incomplete (which agrees, apart from the word semantically,
with EPR claim). This conclusion is relevant in our opinion. It shows, on one
side, that the incompleteness of QM is the price to pay in order to recover
its objectivity. But, on the other side, it opens new interesting possibilities
which were instead forbidden by standard QM, since it is now conceivable
that a broader theory exists which embodies QM but says more than it.
To close up, we stress that, if one considers the Tarskian theory of truth
as correspondence and empirical verificationism as different theories of the
same concept, the concept of truth, the SR interpretation and the standard
interpretation of QM are mutually exclusive. Thus, the SR interpretation of
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QM seems, at this stage, a competitor of the standard interpretation. We
show in the next section, however, that Semantic Realism actually provides a
more general framework in which nonobjectivity and semantic completeness
of the standard interpretation can be reinterpreted and recovered.
5. AN INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Let us show now that one can overcome the dichotomy pointed out at the
end of the last section by considering some structural relationships between
the Tarskian theory of truth and empirical verificationism. These relation-
ships derive from the fact that the former theory distinguishes between truth
and verification of truth (Sec. 2), while the latter takes into account the
same concepts but identifies them. Indeed, the distinction in the Tarskian
theory suggests considering, in the set Ψ of all statements of the observative
language of QM (each of which has a truth value according to this truth
theory) the subset ΨT of all statements whose truth value can be verified by
means of suitable measurements (testable statements ; the set ΨT is strictly
included into Ψ according to QM, since there are complex statements whose
truth values cannot be verified, because of the uncertainty principle). On
the other hand, empirical verificationism selects, via the definition EV (Sec.
3.1) the same set ΨT as the set of all statements that may have a truth value
(while Ψ\ΨT is a set of meaningless statements that must be eliminated in
the observative language of QM, see Sec. 3.3). Thus, the two theories of
truth lead to focus on the same set of statements. Whenever ΨT is endowed
with the standard logical order, that we still denote by ≤, the order struc-
ture (ΨT ,≤) exhibits, from the viewpoint of the Tarskian theory of truth, the
formal properties of the metalinguistic concept of testability in QM, while
it exhibits, from the viewpoint of empirical verificationism, the properties of
the quantum concept of truth.(27) Furthermore, according to the former truth
theory, the subset of all statements of ΨT whose truth value can be verified in
a given physical situation without modifying the situation itself (that is, the
set of all statements that are epistemically accessible in the given situation)
coincides with the subset of all statements selected by the EV definition as
those statements of ΨT that actually have a truth value in that situation (see
Sec. 3.1).
The above remarks imply that the SR interpretation of QM allows one
to recover the results obtained within standard QM, with a different inter-
pretation. Indeed, all arguments concerning truth in standard QM can be
reinterpreted within the SR interpretation as arguments concerning epistemic
accessibility. Thus, our proof of the semantic completeness of standard QM
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in Sec. 3.5 can be seen as a proof of a different and more restricted kind
of completeness, that can be classified as pragmatic, according to the SR
interpretation: to be precise, it is a proof that QM allows one to predict
all properties of a given physical object in a state S that are epistemically
accessible in this state (that is, can be measured without modifying S). In
some sense, this vindicates Bohr within an EPR framework.
To end up, we note that the above discussion illustrates, in the specific
case of QM, a general integrationist perspective, according to which non–
Tarskian theories of truth can be integrated with Tarski’s theory if interpreted
as theories of metalinguistic concepts (as the concept of testability) that are
different from truth. This perspective is useful and fruitful in several senses,
but of course we can only hint at it in this paper.
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